On the development of students’ attitudes towards corruption and cheating in Russian universities by Denisova-Schmidt, Elena et al.
WORKING
PAPERS
SES
N. 467
II.2016
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales
WirtschaFts- und sozialWissenschaFtliche Fakultät
On the Development of 
Students’ Attitudes 
towards Corruption and 
Cheating in Russian 
Universities
Elena Denisova-Schmidt,
Martin Huber and 
Elvira Leontyeva
1 
 
On the Development of Students’ Attitudes  
towards Corruption and Cheating in Russian Universities 
 
Elena Denisova-Schmidt∗, Martin Huber∗∗, and Elvira Leontyeva∗∗∗ 
 
∗ University of St. Gallen 
∗∗ University of Fribourg 
∗∗∗ Pacific National University 
 
 
Abstract: Based on empirical data from selected public universities in Khabarovsk, Russia, this 
paper compares first and fifth year students regarding their attitudes towards corruption in general 
and university corruption in particular. Even after making both groups of students comparable with 
respect to a range of socio-economic characteristics by a matching approach, the results suggest that 
fifth year students are more open to a range of informal and corrupt practices than first years. Our 
analysis therefore points to the possibility that the Russian higher education system might ‘favor’ 
compliance with corruption and informal practices, with potentially detrimental consequences for 
the Russian society as a whole.  
Keywords: Russia, University, Corruption, Ambivalence, Academic Dishonesty, Higher 
Education, Matching  
 
JEL Classification: D73. 
 
The preliminary results of this study were discussed at the ‘Universitet v prostranstve regiona’ 
conference organized by Leonid Blyakher at the Pacific National University in Khabarovsk (Russia) 
on 5-6 May 2014, as well as in the ‘Corruption in the Post-Soviet Educational Systems: Causes, 
Consequences and Control’ workshop organized by the Center for Governance and Culture in 
Europe, University of St.Gallen (GCE-HSG) (Switzerland), on 18 August 2014. We are grateful to 
Meri Avetisyan, Eduard Klein, Yaroslav Prytula, and Mikhail Sokolov for their feedback on the 
initial drafts of this paper. 
 
 
Addresses for correspondence: Elena Denisova-Schmidt (elena.denisova-schmidt@unisg.ch), University of St. Gallen 
(HSG), Gatterstr. 3, 9010 St. Gallen, Switzerland, Martin Huber (martin.huber@unifr.ch), University of Fribourg, Bd. 
de Pérolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland, Elvira Leontyeva (elvira.leontyeva@gmail.com), Pacific National 
University, ul. Tikhookeanskaya 136, 680035 in Khabarovsk, Russia.  
 
∗Elena Denisova-Schmidt is also affiliated with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of University 
College London (UCL-SSEES) and the Boston College Center for International Higher Education (CIHE).  
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Corruption in higher education takes place in many countries (Sweeney, Despota, Lindner, 2013). 
While in some countries, corruption is a deviation from the norm, in others, it is essentially ‘part of 
the system’ (Denisova-Schmidt and Huber, 2014, Denisova-Schmidt and Kryzhko, 2015, Denisova-
Schmidt, Huber and Prytula, 2016). Corruption might be monetary or non-monetary; the latter 
might be even more detrimental, because is more widespread and difficult to capture. Corruption in 
education, including higher education, appears particularly damaging, as it undermines public trust 
in one of the most important societal institutions.  
In this paper, we aim at shedding light on the question of how university education might influence 
their students’ attitudes towards corruption. To do so, we compared first year students with students 
in their final year at Russian universities1 after making them comparable in a range of background 
characteristics (such as gender, subject, university, reasons for getting a diploma, and exposure to 
informal practices during secondary education) based on nearest neighbor matching, see for 
instance Rubin (1974). In addition to university studies, several other factors may be in play, such 
as a simple ageing effect (i.e. people changing their views with age), a generational effect (i.e. 
people born earlier having different attitudes because of different experiences during formative 
years), or an attitude change influenced by nearing entry into the labor market. Russia represents a 
very suitable case for this research question: the country has a long tradition of higher education, a 
high number of students – currently about 80% of the age cohort − with a minimum number of 
drop-outs. Moreover, the university system in Russia is very similar to the secondary school system. 
Students are organized in groups, have classes which they are formally required to attend and the 
exams to be taken in a particular semester are prescribed by the university administration.  
In spite of the existence of various innovative approaches to study educational corruption, many 
scholars work with Transparency International’s definition of corruption – ‘the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain’ – and apply it to both public and private educational institutions (Chapman 
and Lindner 2014, Denisova-Schmidt 2015, 2016). In our paper, we use the definition provided by 
Transparency International as well, but expand it by examining the lack of academic integrity 
(Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Prytula, 2016 and Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Leontyeva, 2016). 
Violations of academic integrity might be considered in different settings: in the university 
admissions process, in the rules set for students, faculty and staff, in the governance of educational 
institutions (Heyneman 2004, 2013) (Table 1). Our results suggest that even after making first and 
fifth-year students comparable in a range of characteristics, fifth-year students are more open to 
several different types of informal and corrupt practices than first-years. Our analysis therefore 
points to the possibility that the Russian higher education system ‘favors’ corruption and 
informality.  
Corruption in the educational sector is not a new phenomenon (Osipian 2007). It has been 
overlooked by researchers for many decades, however (Hallak and Poisson 2007, Heyneman 2013). 
When analyzing corruption in the educational sector today, scholars work with several definitions. 
Amundsen (2000) emphasizes the forms of corruption and focuses on embezzlement, bribery, fraud, 
extortion and favoritism. Tanaka (2001) highlights some areas of corrupt behavior: procurement, 
                                                     
1 In the 2012-13 academic year, there were 1,046 universities in Russia, including 609 state and 437 private schools. In 
addition, there were more than 1,600 regional branches (Androushchak and Yudkevich 2012). About 40 universities 
have a special status; together, they enroll about 15% of all students in Russia. All of the universities receive priority 
financing from the state. In July 2013, 15 out of 40 universities were selected by the Ministry of Education and Science 
as prospective universities for entering world rankings: It was decided that least five Russian universities must enter top 
100 in the world rankings and at least 15 should be in top 200 by 2020 – Project ‘5-100’ (see http://5top100.ru/ for 
more) (Denisova-Schmidt and Leontyeva, 2013). Moreover, since 2012, the Russian government has been regularly 
monitoring all institutions and differentiates between those that are effective and ineffective. The study was conducted 
at universities deemed effective, and not at any of the 40 schools with special status.  
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administration and classroom. Hallak and Poisson (2007) also work with areas of corrupt behavior, 
but provide a much broader definition. They indicate ‘finance’, ‘allocation of specific allowances’, 
‘construction, maintenance and school repairs’, ‘distribution of equipment, furniture and materials’, 
‘writing of textbooks’, ‘teacher appointment, management and training’, ‘teacher behavior’, 
‘information systems’, ‘examinations and diplomas, access to universities’ and ‘institutional 
accreditation’ as areas of possible corrupt behavior. Chapman (2002) stresses several malpractices 
at different levels: ministries, regional/district and international agencies as well as in the 
classroom. Rumyantseva (2005) distinguishes between corruption with and corruption without 
student involvement. Both forms of corruption influence the students’ culture and attitudes; the first 
one does it directly, and the second indirectly. Osipian (2009) defines corruption in education as a 
system of all informal relations aimed to regulate ‘unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial 
assets’. Our paper will offer a new perspective on the role of universities in this process: do they 
possibly influence students’ attitudes towards corruption? We keep in mind, however, that some 
other factors might influence this attitude, such as aging and labor experience. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is not a question that has been discussed previously. We acknowledge that our 
research design and (relatively small) sample can lead only to the formulation of a hypothesis for 
further research. 
 
Table 1: Some Types of Corruption in Higher Education  
Areas  Examples  
 
Some Citations  
University 
admissions  
admission based on blat2 
manipulation during admission exams  
 
Ledeneva 1998, Galitskii & Levin 2004, 
Denisova-Schmidt & Leontyeva 2014 
Academic 
integrity 
(students) 
cheating (crib sheets, copying off)  
plagiarism 
‘outsourcing’ of homework  
ghostwriting of term papers/theses 
services, gifts, informal agreements, or 
payments in exchange for grades or 
preferential treatment  
 
Bowers 1964, Sivak 2006, Latova & Latov 
2007, Callahan 2010, Denisova-Schmidt 2013, 
Wei, Chesnut, Barnard-Brak, & Schmidt 2014, 
Denisova-Schmidt 2015.  
Academic 
integrity (faculty) 
plagiarism  
falsifying data 
ghostwriting 
academic collusion 
 
Karabag & Berggren 2012, Oleinik 2012, 
Osipian 2012, Titaev 2012, Amos 2014, Bruton 
& Rachal 2015. 
 
Academic 
integrity (staff) 
misuse of university funds  
selling admissions 
manipulating accreditation  
 
Zaborskaya et al. 2004, Rumyantseva 2005, 
Rimskii 2010, Ganesan 2013.  
University 
management 
degree mills  
sham degrees 
nepotism, cronyism, or favoritism in hiring 
and promoting faculty and staff  
 
Vincent-Lancrin 2013, Osipian 2013, 
Rumyantseva and Denisova-Schmidt 2015. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data base and provides 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the empirical method. Section 4 presents the results. 
Section 5 concludes.   
 
                                                     
2 Blat in the USSR referred to the use of informal networks ‘to obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a 
way around formal procedures’ (Ledeneva 1998, p. 1).  
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2. Data 
 
Our data set comes from a survey based on questionnaires (n=463) that was conducted at selected 
universities in Khabarovsk − a major Russian city located in the Far East with a population of more 
than 600,000 − between 2012 and 2013. In the 2012-13 academic year, about 73,000 students were 
enrolled at universities in the Khabarovsk region (Obrazovanie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2014, 2015). 
More than 50% of them studied at the four universities3 covered by our study. These universities are 
among the better-than-average universities in Russia. The sample includes only subjects who were 
studying on site at state universities in three main subject areas: economics, the humanities and 
engineering, representing the majority of all students. The results of our pilot study showed that 
many students often condemn large-scale corruption involving high-profile politicians and 
businesspeople and overlook petty corruption – especially in cases with their personal involvement. 
Hence we decided to include two qualitative tools – expert interviews (n=23) and focus groups 
(n=7) − in order to understand the reasons for justifying corruption from the students’ point of view 
(Denisova-Schmidt, 2013).   
We were given access to university administrative records and based on the latter, we were able to 
pick a random sample. This level of access is not typical in Russia, as it usually requires the 
approval of the rector, which is hardly possible to obtain for any studies covering corruption at 
universities: no one wants to air their own dirty laundry in public. The respondents were selected 
according to the multi-stage quota sampling. In the first stage, we defined the quota in accordance 
with the number of students enrolled at universities. In the second stage, we defined the quota in 
proportion to the number of departments. In the last stage, we invited every fifth student, 
alphabetically, from each group. If the student was absent, we invited the following student on the 
list.    
Of the 463 survey participants, 314 were first year students and 149 were in their fifth year. The 
first year students were typically 17 years of age, while the fifth year students were around 21. 
Table 2 presents the means of a range of characteristics (or covariates) for both groups of students. 
Previous research has pointed to other factors that might influence corrupt behavior, such as gender 
(women are usually less likely to be perceived as corrupt) (see, for example, Swamy, Knack, Lee, 
Azfar, 2001, Shaw, Katsaiti and Pecoraro, 2014 and Jetter and Walker, 2015) and experience with 
corruption (people with previous personal experience with corruption and/or those who believe that 
everyone around them is corrupt are more prone to corruption) (see, for example, John, 
Loewenstein, and Rick, 2014). Hence we included ‘gender’ as one of the variables, as well as 
several questions about the respondents’ previous experience with monetary and non-monetary 
corruption in everyday life (‘friends/relatives use bribery for solving problems’ and 
‘friends/relatives use connections for solving problems’). Moreover, one of our questions pertained 
to ‘gifts during school time’. Gifts might be given without overt intentions as a part of the Russian 
academic culture (Denisova-Schmidt, 2015, 2016), but sometimes these gifts might carry certain 
expectations (i.e., a ‘forced’ gift that looks like a ‘free’ one) (Ledeneva, 2014). We did not 
distinguish this ambivalence in our study, however. We also asked our respondents about their 
reasons for pursuing a higher education, their living situation before university admission and their 
                                                     
3 In the 2012-13 academic year, about 73,000 students were enrolled at universities in the Khabarovsk region 
(Obrazovanie v Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2014, 2015). More than 50% of them studied at the four universities covered by 
our study. We were given access to university administrative records and from those lists, we were able to pick a 
random sample. This level of access is not typical in Russia, as it usually requires the approval of the rector, which is 
hardly possible to obtain for any studies covering corruption at universities: no one wants to air their own dirty laundry 
in public. The respondents were selected according to the multi-stage quota sampling. In the first stage, we defined the 
quota in accordance with the number of students enrolled at universities. In the second stage, we defined the quota in 
proportion to the number of departments. In the last stage, we invited every fifth student, alphabetically, from each 
group. If the student was absent, we invited the following student on the list.    
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field of their studies. These characteristics might also help us to understand possible correlations 
with corrupt behavior (Leontyeva, 2010, Denisova-Schmidt and Leontyeva, 2015). While both 
genders were represented almost equally among the first year students, the majority of the final-year 
students were female. Important differences between sampled fifth and first year students also occur 
in the choice of the university and subject, the reason for obtaining a higher education, and previous 
exposure to informal practices and corruption during secondary schooling or through friends and 
relatives. 
 
Table 2: Covariate means across groups in the survey (prior to matching)  
variable name  fifth year first year  
gender: male 0.262 0.487 
student of humanities 0.262 0.292 
student of economics 0.317 0.230 
reason for studying: good education 0.552  0.644 
reason for studying: diploma 0.503  0.247 
frequent gift to teacher in school: flowers 0.386 0.272 
frequent gift to teacher in school: tableware 0.159 0.048 
frequent gift to teacher in school: alcohol 0.055 0.019 
friends/relatives use bribing for solving problems 0.628 0.779 
friends/relatives use connections for solving problems  0.290 0.436 
dummy for university 1 0.497 0.487 
dummy for university 2 0.152 0.167 
dummy for university 3 0.124 0.240 
hometown: 100,000-500,000 inhabitants 0.117 0.077 
hometown: less than 100,000 inhabitants 0.524 0.455  
 
It should be mentioned that it was challenging to conduct this particular survey. Some of the 
universities in the city are in the process of merging with other schools, while other universities 
were no longer in operation.4 Often, university administrations do not welcome any such empirical 
surveys, as they are afraid of ‘covert inspections’.5 Access to students was granted through a few 
professors who agreed to participate by allowing entire groups of their students to fill out 
questionnaires.     
 
3. Empirical Method  
In our analysis of the data, we apply a covariate matching technique – namely, nearest neighbor 
Mahalanobis distance matching as implemented in the ‘psmatch2’ package by Leuven and Sianesi 
(2003) for the statistical software ‘Stata’. This method allows us to compare first year and fifth year 
students in terms of corrupt behavior, while making the two groups comparable with regard to 
observed characteristics (or covariates) already presented in Table 2, such as their gender, 
hometown, subject, university, reasons for getting a diploma, frequency of presents given during 
secondary schooling and previous experience using connections and bribes to solve problems in 
                                                     
4 The Russian government plans to reduce the number of universities by 2020, eliminating up to 80% of regional 
branches and up to 40% of universities (Trushin, 2015).  
5 Mergers of universities also mean that some of the faculty will be dismissed and/or some of the programs will be 
closed. How can Russian organizations issue lay-offs if the majority of the faculty has permanent positions and are well 
protected by the Russian Labor Law? How can Russian universities close any programs, if they are running 
successfully? One of the options is to look for formal mistakes made by the faculty and/or program administration in 
order to find an official reason for dismissing and/or closing. To find these mistakes ‘covert’ inspections are organized – 
a practice that can be traced back to Tsarist Russia. The Tsar let their officials visit Russian cities to see if the reality 
indeed compares to the written reports he/she received on a regularly basis. These inspections were either open or 
covert. The Russian-Ukrainian novelist Nikolai Gogol (1809-1852) described this practice in his book ‘The 
Government Inspector’ (1836).  
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daily life. We believe that these characteristics might influence corrupt activities. Furthermore, the 
covariates are also statistically related to being a fifth vs. a first year student as shown in the probit 
regression results reported in Table A1 in the appendix, implying that both groups systematically 
differ in these characteristics. Therefore, the aforementioned covariates should be controlled for 
when investigating the differences in corrupt behavior that are merely related to being a first year or 
a fifth year student (net of the covariates). 
More precisely, our nearest neighbor matching approach matches to each fifth year student the first 
year student that is most similar in terms of the covariates with replacement (implying that the same 
first year student can, in principle, be used as a comparison for several fifth year students whenever 
most similar). The idea is to generate a first year sample that is as comparable as possible to the 
fifth year students in these characteristics in order to investigate any remaining average differences 
in the corruption behavior of fifth and first year students. In the treatment of impact evaluation 
literature (see for instance Imbens, 2004), our estimated parameter corresponds to the ‘average 
treatment effect on the treated’. Note that ‘similarity in terms of the covariates’ is defined in terms 
of the Mahalanobis distance.6 The standard errors of the estimated average differences are 
computed based on the Abadie and Imbens (2006) variance estimator for matching.    
Matching is successful if it equilibrates (or balances) the covariate distributions across fifth and 
matched first year students, which may be investigated by so-called after-matching tests. To this 
end, Table 3 reports the covariate means across student groups, along with standardized biases (see 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 2005) and two sample t-tests. We see that most covariates are well balanced 
across fifth and matched first year students, as their means are rather similar, the t-statistics on mean 
differences are not significant, and the standardized biases are not ‘too large’ (i.e., below an 
absolute value of 20; see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 2005). An exception is the dummy variable 
‘reason for studying: to obtain a good education’, which has a standardized bias of -22.5 and a p-
value just slightly above the 5% level of significance. All in all, matching nevertheless succeeded in 
making the covariate distributions between the two student groups similar.  
 Table 3: Covariate means across groups along with standardized biases and t-tests  
variable name fifth year  matched first year std.b t-stat p-val 
gender: male 0.262 0.262 0.0 0.000 1.000 
student of humanities 0.262 0.269 -1.5 -0.130 0.895 
student of economics 0.317 0.283 7.7 0.640 0.523 
reason for studying: good education 0.552 0.662 -22.5 -1.930 0.055 
reason for studying: diploma 0.503 0.448 11.8 0.940 0.349 
frequent gift to teacher in school: flowers 0.386 0.352 7.4 0.610 0.544 
frequent gift to teacher in school: tableware 0.159 0.131 9.2 0.670 0.506 
frequent gift to teacher in school: alcohol 0.055 0.055 0.0 0.000 1.000 
friends/relatives use bribing for solving problems 0.628 0.690 -13.7 -1.110 0.267 
friends/relatives use connections for solving problems  0.290 0.310 -4.3 -0.380 0.702 
dummy for university 1 0.497 0.524 -5.5 -0.470 0.640 
dummy for university 2 0.152 0.138 3.8 0.330 0.740 
dummy for university 3 0.124 0.145 -5.4 -0.510 0.607 
hometown: 100,000-500,000 inhabitants 0.117 0.110 2.3 0.180 0.854 
hometown: less than 100,000 inhabitants 0.524 0.476 9.7 0.820 0.413 
                                                     
6 The Mahalanobis distance is a weighted average of the discrepancies of each of the covariates between any fifth year 
student and any potentially matched first year student, where the weight is proportional to the inverse of the covariance 
matrix of the covariates. This weighting approach at the same time normalizes the distances between covariates (giving 
less weight to distances with a high variance) and accounts for the covariance between distances (giving less weight to 
covariate distances that highly correlate with another distance). We refer to Zhao (2004) for a detailed discussion of 
distance metrics in matching estimators. 
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4. Results  
The subsequent discussion and tables present the results of interest, namely the average differences 
in various measures of attitudes towards corrupt behavior across fifth year and matched first year 
students, along with standard errors (see ‘S.E.’) and t-statistics (see ‘T-stat’). Specifically, the tables 
report both the raw differences in the corruption measures before matching (see ‘Unmatched’) and 
after making first year students comparable to fifth year students in terms of the covariates by 
matching (see ‘Matched’).      
Table 4: Lack of academic integrity  
Areas  Examples  
Taking Exams copying off during exams or tests  
using crib sheets and other unauthorized materials during exams 
Writing Papers  downloading term papers (or other papers) from the internet 
writing a paper by copying and pasting text from the internet 
purchasing term papers (or other papers) from special agencies or from other students 
Communicating  
with Professors  
asking a professor for preferential treatment  
(easing requirements, exemption from an exam) 
giving a professor fraudulent or misleading excuses for poor academic performance 
(absence from lectures, failure to meet deadlines for written papers, failure to appear for an 
exam) 
Source: Denisova-Schmidt 2013, 2015, 2016. 
 
One of the questions in the survey was concerned with different cheating techniques of students 
when taking exams, writing papers and communicating with professors (see Table 4). Concisely, we 
asked students to which extent various informal practices that violate academic integrity are 
acceptable for them.7 The results presented in Table 5 suggest that the usage of several cheating 
techniques is significantly more common among fifth-year students than among first-years, even 
when accounting for differences in covariates: ‘using crib sheets and other unauthorized materials 
during exams’, ‘copying off during exams or tests’, ‘downloading term papers (or other papers) 
from the internet’ and ‘giving a professor fraudulent or misleading excuses for poor academic 
performance’ are all significant at the 10% level or even a lower level of significance.  
Table 5: Students’ attitudes towards cheating techniques − Question: What practices are 
acceptable for you? 
Area Actions   fifth year first year Difference S.E. T-stat 
Taking Exams  Using crib sheets and 
other unauthorized 
materials during exams  
 
Unmatched 2.46 2.24 0.21 0.06 3.25∗∗∗ 
Matched 2.46 2.19 0.26 0.10 2.73∗∗∗ 
Copying off during 
exams or tests 
Unmatched 2.33 1.96 0.37 0.07 5.47∗∗∗ 
Matched 2.33 1.87 0.46 0.11 4.26∗∗∗ 
 
Writing Papers 
 
downloading term papers 
(or other papers) from the 
internet 
 
 
Unmatched 
 
2.08 
 
1.82 
 
0.26 
 
0.07 
 
3.56∗∗∗ 
Matched 2.08 1.81 0.28 0.12 2.32∗∗ 
writing a paper by 
copying and pasting text 
Unmatched 2.64 2.68 -0.04 0.05 -0.74 
Matched 2.64 2.73 -0.09 0.08 -1.09 
                                                     
7 Here and in other questions, the students reported on their perceptions and attitudes, not about their actual behavior.  
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from the internet 
 
purchasing term papers 
(or other papers) from 
special agencies or from 
other students 
 
Unmatched 1.62 1.53 0.09 0.07 1.18 
Matched 1.62 1.44 0.18 0.11 1.62 
Communicating 
with Professors  
giving a professor 
fraudulent or misleading 
excuses for poor 
academic performance 
Unmatched 1.65 1.49 0.16 0.07 2.31∗∗ 
Matched 1.65 1.45 0.20 0.11 1.87∗ 
asking a professor for 
preferential treatment 
Unmatched 1.54 1.58 -0.03 0.07 -0.43 
Matched 1.54 1.53 0.01 0.11 0.13 
Note: *, **, *** means that the mean differences between first and fifth year students are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
% level, respectively. ‘Unmatched’ refers to the raw differences prior to matching, ‘matched’ to the difference after 
matching on covariates. Scale of the outcome variables: 1=never, 2=rarely, 3=seldom, 4=often, 5=systematically.  
Our results suggest that not only in statistical, but also in economic terms, the differences between 
fifth and first year students are important after making them comparable in the covariates: the 
means of ‘using crib sheets and other unauthorized materials during exams’ are 12% larger in the 
fifth than in the first year, while ‘copying off during exams or tests’ increases by 25%, 
‘downloading term papers (or other papers) from the internet’ by 15%, ‘purchasing term papers (or 
other papers) from special agencies or from other students’ by 12.5% and ‘giving a professor 
fraudulent or misleading excuses for poor academic performance’ by 14%. In contrast, the 
differences in ‘asking a professor for preferential treatment’ and ‘writing a paper by copying and 
pasting text from the internet’ are both statistically and economically insignificant.  
The qualitative results coming from the expert interviews and focus groups suggest that students 
develop ambivalent attitudes toward the lack of academic integrity. On the one hand, they condemn 
these practices; on the other hand, they can justify them. The reasons for legitimation are 1) time 
saving, 2) the lack of awareness; 3) protest; and 4) the student’s general attitude towards higher 
education. Students often deem different cheating techniques in academia to be time saving, 
especially with regard to ‘unnecessary’ classes and the need to have a job during their studies: 
‘There are general subjects which are not related to the future activity of a particular specialist... To 
pass it, one can use a cheat sheet, in order to simply pass and forget it’. Students are often unaware 
that they are doing anything wrong, especially in their preparation of term papers and theses. 
‘Copying and pasting’ from the internet seems to be a common method of academic writing. In 
some cases, students might have doubts about the content of their education in general, and about 
the didactical competencies of some of their professors in particular, with the result that the students 
do not want to spend their time and energy doing things that will not be required on the job market. 
Finally the tendency in Russian society to believe that only higher education can secure one’s 
professional future leads to the fact that many young people attending the university are not really 
prepared to study at such a high level. Moreover, some students tend to prepare crib sheets, but do 
not necessary use them or want to use them during exams; rather it is ‘a kind of preparation for an 
exam’. Some students download papers in order to have examples of academic writing and an 
impetus for their own ideas: ‘it is a good example from both the substantive and formal points of 
view’, that is, the students may look at the structure of such papers, the cited authors, as well as the 
rules of formatting (Denisova-Schmidt, 2013).  
 
Table 6: Bribes at Universities - Question: Have you ever heard that they take bribes at the 
universities? 
answer  fifth year first year Difference S.E. T-stat 
yes Unmatched 0.67 0.43 0.23 0.05 4.69*** 
Matched 0.67 0.44 0.23 0.07 3.10*** 
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Note: *, **, *** means that the mean differences between first and fifth year students are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
% level, respectively. ‘Unmatched’ refers to the raw differences prior to matching, ‘matched’ to the difference after 
matching on covariates. Scale of the outcome variables: 1=yes, 0=no.  
A further question concerns the awareness about monetary corruption in universities. As shown in 
Table 6, fifth year students more frequently state to have heard about bribes at universities than first 
year students (significant at the 1% level), even after making the student groups comparable in the 
covariates: the difference in awareness across group amounts to 52% (!). Moreover, fifth year 
students consider corruption more frequently as a ‘necessity’ (significant at the 10% level), a 
‘national peculiarity’ (10% level) and ‘an everyday occurrence’ (5% level), see Table 7. They 
therefore appear to have a more pragmatic attitude towards this phenomenon than first year 
students. This pragmatic attitude might also be influenced by the ageing effect. 
 
Table 7: Definition of corruption − Question: What is corruption to you? 
 Definition   fifth year first year Difference S.E. T-stat 
Negative 
approach  
Evil Unmatched 0.39 0.38 0.01 0.05 0.23 
Matched 0.39 0.37 0.02 0.07 0.28 
Crime Unmatched 0.59 0.58 0.01 0.05 0.19 
Matched 0.59 0.64 -0.06 0.07 -0.74 
Pragmatic 
approach 
Necessity Unmatched 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.03 2.39** 
Matched 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.04 1.95* 
An everyday 
occurrence 
Unmatched 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.03 2.76*** 
Matched 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.05 2.29** 
Positive 
approach 
A way of getting 
income 
Unmatched 0.30 0.25 0.05 0.04 1.05 
Matched 0.30 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.51 
Compensation for 
low wages 
Unmatched 0.30 0.23 0.07 0.04 1.66* 
Matched 0.30 0.29 0.01 0.07 0.21 
Neutral 
approach  
Temporary situation Unmatched 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.32 
Matched 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.20 
Part of life Unmatched 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.04 2.00 
Matched 0.20 0.21 -0.01 0.06 -0.11 
‘Russian’ 
approach  
Tradition Unmatched 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.03 -0.30 
Matched 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.82 
National peculiarity Unmatched 0.26 0.19 0.07 0.04 1.78* 
Matched 0.26 0.15 0.11 0.06 1.79* 
Note: *, **, *** means that the mean differences between first and fifth year students are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
% level, respectively. ‘Unmatched’ refers to the raw differences prior to matching, ‘matched’ to the difference after 
matching on covariates. Scale of the outcome variables: 1=never, 2=rarely, 3=seldom, 4=often, 5=systematically.  
Table 8 reports differences in the subjective acceptability of formal, informal and illegal practices 
for job searches were codified. The results suggest that fifth year students to a significantly higher 
extent prefer to use informal tools such as protection from relatives and friends (significant at the 
10% level) as well as blat (Ledeneva 1998) and connections (significant at the 5% level) in their job 
searches – practices that are considered corrupt by Transparency International, in the form of 
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nepotism and favoritism.8 In contrast, the willingness to do a service in return (another informal 
tool), but also to contact a recruiting agency is significantly lower (significant at the 5% level) than 
among (matched) first-years. No significant effects were found for the use of other formal 
instruments such as ‘reading job ads in the mass media’ and ‘registering with a job center’, nor for 
the use of such illegal job search techniques as ‘awakening the monetary interest of an employer’, 
‘bringing an expensive gift’ or ‘providing false data about yourself’.  
Table 8: The job search: acceptable and less acceptable tools − Question: What job search 
tools are acceptable according to your opinion? 
 actions  fifth year first year Difference S.E. T-stat 
Formal Contacting a recruiting agency Unmatched 2.29 2.37 -0.07 0.07 -1.03 
Matched 2.29 2.49 -0.20   0.10 -2.04** 
Reading job ads in the mass 
media  
Unmatched 2.63 2.62 0.01 0.06 0.22 
Matched 2.63 2.69 -0.06 0.09 -0.73 
Registering with a job center Unmatched 2.36 2.42 -0.06 0.07 -0.94 
Matched 2.36 2.48 -0.12 0.10 -1.26 
Informal 
 
Patronage of relatives and 
friends 
Unmatched 2.31 2.11 0.20 0.07 3.07*** 
Matched 2.31 2.14 0.18 0.10 1.85* 
Looking for connections, 
arrange on blat 
Unmatched 2.21 2.01 0.20 0.07 2.74*** 
Matched 2.21 1.94 0.26 0.10 2.56** 
Doing a service in return Unmatched 1.67 1.83 -0.16 0.07 -2.27** 
Matched 1.67 1.91 -0.24 0.10 -2.55** 
Illegal Awakening monetary interest 
of an employer 
Unmatched 1.59 1.58 0.01 0.08 0.12 
Matched 1.59 1.51 0.08 0.11 0.73 
Bringing an expensive gift Unmatched 1.19 1.23 -0.04 0.05 -0.74 
Matched 1.19 1.16 0.03 0.07 0.43 
Providing false data about 
yourself 
Unmatched 1.34 1.20 0.14 0.06 2.44** 
Matched 1.34 1.23 0.11 0.08 1.31 
Note: *, **, *** means that the mean differences between first and fifth year students are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
% level, respectively. ‘Unmatched’ refers to the raw differences prior to matching, ‘matched’ to the difference after 
matching on covariates. Scale of the outcome variables: 1=never, 2=rarely, 3=seldom, 4=often, 5=systematically.  
 
A final question concerns the students’ view on whether it is possible to overcome corruption in 
Russia, see Table 9. Interestingly, both first and fifth-year students are rather positive about that, as 
indicated by the low average score of roughly 1.3 in either group (note that 1=yes and 2=no). Mean 
differences are small and insignificant, both before and after matching.  
Table 9: Overcome corruption in Russia − Question: Is it possible to overcome corruption in 
Russia?  
 
 fifth year first year Difference S.E. T-stat 
Unmatched 1.28 1.25 0.02 0.04 0.55 
Matched 1.28 1.25 0.03 0.06 0.44 
                                                     
8 This might also be explained thorough the fact that fifth-year students already have experience in searching for a job 
and holding a job.  
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Note: *, **, *** means that the mean differences between first and fifth year students are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
% level, respectively. ‘Unmatched’ refers to the raw differences prior to matching, ‘matched’ to the difference after 
matching on covariates. Scale of the outcome variables: 1=yes, 2=no.  
 
Summing up, our results imply that advanced students are much more inclined to engage in 
informal practices and corrupt behavior than first year students. This suggests a process of learning 
about and/or adaptation to corrupt practices in the course of university education. Our analysis 
therefore points to the possibility that the Russian higher education system has, from a social 
perspective, an undesirable side effect on its graduates: It may make them more open to corruption 
or compliant with the corrupt structures in place, thus potentially hampering economic and social 
development in the country as a whole (see, for example, Heyneman, 2004).  
However, it is important to bear the following limitations and caveats in mind when interpreting our 
results. First, there is the issue of potential dropout (or attrition) bias that might occur during 
university education and could jeopardize our matching-based comparison of fifth and first year 
students. It is worth noting that the dropout rate of students at Russian universities is relatively low. 
In a study conducted at one of the elite universities in Moscow in 2011, Gruzdev, Gorbunova and 
Frumin (2013) noted a dropout rate of 16% at the bachelor/specialty9 level (n=194). Even after 
dropping out, only 4% of the students actually left the higher education system: 40% of these 
dropouts continued their studies at the same university, 34% transferred to other universities, 12% 
planned to continue their studies and 10% had already graduated.10 A transfer from/to a different 
university could imply that the pool of students considered in our study changed to a small extent 
between the first and fifth year, but should arguably not be a major issue after matching on socio-
economic characteristics. Second, our analysis does not disentangle changes in corrupt behavior 
which are due to university education from age effects that might occur even without higher 
education. While we cannot address this issue in our data (as we cannot make first and fifth-year 
students comparable in age for obvious reasons), our strong suspicion is that an important share of 
the differences is driven by the university system, given that the age difference between the groups 
is only a few years. At the very least, our analysis suggests that the higher education system does 
not prevent adolescents from becoming more inclined towards corruption over time.     
Third, we asked about the personal perception and attitudes towards corruption and the lack of 
academic integrity, rather than about actual experiences students might have had during their 
university studies. We therefore followed Heyneman (2013) who advocates ‘ignoring’ the 
discussions about perception vs. actual evidence in analyzing corruption in the educational sector: 
‘when an institution is perceived to be corrupt the damage is already done, regardless of whether 
guilt is manifest’. It therefore needs to be borne in mind that all our results are to be interpreted as 
perceived corruption rather than realized corruption. Finally, we did not question the professorate: 
what do they usually do if their students cheat? The latest research shows that the faculty usually 
does not notice and/or pretends not to notice these activities (Denisova-Schmidt and Leontyeva 
2015, Rumyantseva and Denisova-Schmidt, 2015).  
 
 
 
                                                     
9 Specialty (specialitet) – the previous educational system, which culminated with a diploma.  
10 This might be explained through some peculiarities of the Russian higher education system: If a student does not pass 
an exam within a certain period of time (sessiia), he/she should be expelled. A student has the chance to repeat the 
exam, however, and if the second test is successful, his/her status as a student will be reinstated, usually in the same 
academic year. Moreover, students who have not completed their higher education have almost no chances on the job 
market and their professional future might be unclear. Young men often consider university studies in order to be 
exempted from military service. If they are expelled, they will be called up for their service immediately.  
12 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Using a student sample from selected public universities in Khabarovsk, Russia, we compared first 
and fifth-year students regarding their attitudes towards corruption in general and university 
corruption in particular. The results suggest that fifth-years are more open to a range of informal 
and corrupt practices than first-years even after making both groups comparable with respect to a 
range of socio-economic characteristics (such as gender, subject, hometown, motivation for going 
to university and previous experience of corruptive behavior) by matching (on the Mahalanobis 
distance). Our study therefore suggests that the students’ attitudes become more favorable towards 
corruption during their university studies, which points to the possibility that the Russian higher 
education system ‘favors’ compliance with corruption and informal practices. In addition to 
university studies, however, several other factors may be in play, such as an ageing effect (i.e. 
people changing with age), a generational effect (i.e. people born earlier having different attitudes 
because of different experience during formative years), or a nearing entry into the labor market. 
Nevertheless, adolescents that complete their socialization by learning various cheating techniques 
and by becoming more confident in corrupt practices may transfer this attitude to their professional 
lives, thus hampering economic and social development (s. discussions in Grimes, 2004). From a 
policy perspective, it therefore seems advisable to tackle university corruption as well as its 
ambivalence even more determinedly. More research is required in order to investigate which anti-
corruption strategies are both effective and feasible. Moreover, further research needs to be 
conducted both to enable meaningful comparisons between first and fifth year students and to 
disentangle the influence of higher education from other influences. Ideally, one would set up an 
experiment with two groups of universities. In the first group, interventions would take place on a 
regular basis (i.e., corruption at these universities is explicitly prohibited), while the second group 
would be the “control group” that corresponds to the Russian average. When comparing the 
behavior of the students in one group with that of the other, one would thus be comparing students 
of the same age (i.e., first years in group 1 vs. first years in group 2, etc.). This would allow 
isolating the effect of the intervention from that of the students’ relative ages. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Selection into being a fifth vs. a first year student based on probit regression  
variable name      coef. std.err. p-value 
gender: male -0.633 0.145 0.000 
student of humanities -0.283 0.183 0.122 
student of economics -0.295 0.220 0.179 
reason for studying: good education -0.253 0.138 0.067 
reason for studying: diploma 0.651 0.141 0.000 
frequent gift to teacher in school: flowers 0.288 0.146 0.048 
frequent gift to teacher in school: tableware 0.529 0.245 0.031 
frequent gift to teacher in school: alcohol 0.424 0.369 0.251 
ever seen friends/relatives use bribing for solving problems -0.213 0.156 0.173 
ever seen friends/relatives use connections for solving problems  -0.222 0.150 0.138 
dummy for university 1 -0.319 0.251 0.202 
dummy for university 2 -0.447 0.318 0.160 
dummy for university 3 -0.945 0.321 0.003 
hometown: 100,000-500,000 inhabitants 0.273 0.240 0.255 
hometown: less than 100,000 inhabitants 0.285 0.145 0.049 
constant 0.148 0.321 0.645 
pseudo R squared 0.168     
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